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Abstract	
This	paper	explores	a	less	well-examined	aspect	of	time	in	relation	to	higher	education	and	
the	academy;	that	of	 ‘time-future’.	The	paper	takes	the	case	of	education	trade	strategies	
being	pursued	by	governments	and	allied	agencies,	and	explores	the	multiple	ways	in	which	
time-future	is	mobilised.			Drawing	on	trade	documents,	government	statistics,	and	related	
reports,	the	paper	points	to	two	time-future	dynamics	at	work.	The	first	dynamic	focuses	on	
the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 future	 is	 imagined	 by	 strategic	 actors,	 and	 legitimating	 through	
creating	 equivalences	 between	 education	 trade,	 economic	 growth	 and	 prosperity.	 The	
second	dynamic	explores	the	ways	in	which	the	current	round	of	global	and	regional	trade	
negotiations	colonise	the	future	as	a	political	resource.			I	reflect	on	how	time-future	is	a	key	
resource	 and	 modality	 of	 power	 to	 be	 claimed	 and	 cognitively	 shaped	 so	 as	 to	 reorient	
actor’s	expectations	 towards	 the	 rhythms	and	demands	of	 capitalism,	and	away	 from	 the	
temporal	orders	of	the	academy.		However,	efforts	to	commodify	higher	education,	on	the	
one	 hand,	 and	 colonise	 higher	 education	 futures	 exclusively	 to	 serve	 the	 interests	 of	
economic	 investors,	 on	 the	 other,	 continue	 to	 be	 contested.	 As	 a	 result,	 a	 new	 temporal	
order	is	yet	to	become	common-sense,	and	an	existing	order	is	yet	to	die.	
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Introduction	
A	 special	 issue	 given	 over	 to	 exploring	 the	 relationship	 between	 education,	 time	 and	 the	
future	is	an	opportunity	to	think	in	more	theoretically	informed	ways	about	this	relation.	To	
be	 sure,	 time	 features	 implicitly	 in	 the	work	of	 social	 scientists	 concerned	with	 the	 social	
and	 political	 nature	 of	 education;	 for	 example,	 when	 they	 explore	 questions	 of	 social	
mobility,	 social	 reproduction,	 shifts	 in	 education	 governance	 over	 time,	 and	 so	 on.	
Education	policy	analysts	also	implicitly	 invoke	time	and	the	future	in	their	examination	of	
policies,	most	of	which	are	aimed	at	bringing	about	 some	kind	of	 change	 into	 the	 future.		
This	state	of	affairs	is	not	just	an	issue	for	social	theorists	of	education.	Helga	Nowotny,	in	a	
seminal	essay	on	time	and	social	theory	published	in	1992,	argues	that	whilst	time	has	more	
recently	featured	as	a	context	and	theme	of	research	into	social	life,	theorising	social	time	in	
a	more	 substantive	way	 has	 continued	 to	 lag	 behind.	 This	 is	 in	 part	 because,	 as	 Barbara	
Adam	reminds	us	“…time	is	a	deeply	taken-for-granted	aspect	of	social	life”	(1990:	9).		
Over	 the	 past	 two	 decades,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 growing	 engagement	 with	 time	 by	 social	
theorists,	 including	 the	 nature	 of	 social	 time	 in	 education	 sectors	 and	 settings.	 In	
Timewatch,	Adam	(1995)	has	a	whole	chapter	on	a	range	of	education	practices.	She	shows	
the	 ways	 in	 which,	 through	 the	 hidden	 curriculum,	 “…dominant	 temporal	 structures	 and	
norms	 of	 society	 are	 absorbed,	 maintained,	 re-created	 and	 changed	 in	 daily	 educational	
practice”	 (p.	 59).	 	 Through	 clocks,	 timetables	 and	 schedules,	 children	 in	 western	 schools	
learn	how	long,	in	what	order,	and	with	what	speed	to	work	both	now	and	into	the	future.	
Researchers	of	educational	processes	also	use	complex	time	orders,	from	time	series	data	to	
trends	 and	 panel	 reports	 that	 in	 turn	 orient	 us	 socially	 and	 cognitively	 to	 the	 world	 in	
particular	ways.			
Much	of	the	more	recent	work	on	social	time	in	higher	education	explores	the	way	in	which	
time	is	mediated	by	neo-liberal	globalisation:	for	example,	academic	thought	time	is	recast	
as	money	 time	 (cf.	Noonan,	2016);	academic	work	 is	experienced	by	 individuals	as	one	of	
time	 shortages	 (cf.	 Ylijoki	 and	 Mäntylä	 2003;	 Vostal,	 2015,	 2016);	 research	 time	 is	
experienced	 as	 a	 juxtaposition	 of	 different	 temporalities	 (Lapping,	 2016).	 Yet	 aside	 from	
work	on	scenarios	and	other	forms	of	horizon	scanning	(cf.	Vincent-Lancrin,	2004;	Blass	et	
al.,	2010),	 the	 substantive	 theorising	of	 time-future	 in	higher	education	 remains	 relatively	
under-developed,	and	particularly	so	in	relation	to	questions	of	power,	and	of	the	future	as	
a	resource	to	be	colonised.		
My	 entry	 point	 in	 this	 paper	 will	 be	 the	 analysis	 of	 a	 case	 of	 the	 discursive	 recasting	 of	
higher	 education	 as	 a	 global	 trade	 in	 services	 sector.	 Drawing	 on	 trade	 documents	 and	
related	reports,	I	point	to	two	time-future	dynamics.	Firstly,	I	will	focus	on	the	diverse	ways	
in	 which	 the	 future	 is	 imagined	 by	 strategic	 actors,	 and	 legitimating	 through	 creating	
equivalences	between	education	trade	and	economic	growth	and	prosperity.	Secondly,	I	will	
show	the	way	in	which	the	current	round	of	global	and	regional	trade	negotiations,	such	as	
the	Trade	in	Services	Agreement	(TISA),	the	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	(TPP),	Comprehensive	
Economic	Trade	Agreement	(CETA)	and	the	Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership	
(TTIP),	all	seek	to	colonise	the	future	as	a	resource	(Hägerstrand,	1985)	through	mechanisms	
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such	as	progressive	liberalisation/lock-in	clauses	so	as	to	place	these	agreement	off	limits	to	
democratic	politics	into	the	future.		
Briefly,	 progressive	 liberalisation	 refers	 to	 the	 further	 extension	 and	 deepening	 of	 ‘free-
market’	policies	aimed	at	limiting	state	regulations.	Lock-in	clauses	are	used	to	place	limits	
on	 governments	 putting	 a	 brake	 on,	 or	 reversing,	 liberalisation	 tendencies	 via	 increased	
state	 regulation.	 	 Future-time	 is	 thus	 a	 critical	 political	 resource	 to	 be	 captured,	 whilst	
individual	actor’s		orientations	to	this	different	market	future	needs	to	also	be	recalibrated	
so	 as	 to	 stabilise	 new	 meanings,	 practices	 and	 commonsense.	 These	 mega-trade	
agreements	seek	to	transform	the	future	into	an	extended	present	(Nowotny,	1994),	whilst	
the	extended	present	contains	the	progressive	cognitive	reorientation	of	actors	to	a	future	
shaped	 by	 capitalist	 dynamics	 (Beckert,	 2016).	 However,	 efforts	 to	 commodify	 higher	
education	 and	 colonise	 higher	 education	 futures	 exclusively	 to	 serve	 the	 interests	 of	
economic	 investors	 continue	 to	be	 contested.	As	a	 result,	 a	new	 temporal	order	 is	 yet	 to	
become	common-sense,	and	an	existing	order	is	yet	to	die.	The	structure	of	the	paper	is	as	
follows.	 I	begin	with	an	account	of	efforts	 to	reimagine	higher	education	and	 its	 temporal	
order	 and	 how	 this	 in	 turn	 challenges	 the	 orientations	 of	 contemporary	 academics	 and	
institutionalised	social	practices.	 	 I	 then	turn	to	a	brief	outline	of	the	work	of	Jens	Beckert	
(2016)	 and	Helga	Nowotny	 (1992,	 1994,	 2016)	 as	 resources	 to	 analyse	 the	 case	 of	 global	
higher	education	markets	and	trade	and	how	their	realisation	within	capitalist	markets	 involves	
the	cognitive	reorientation	of	actors.		
			
Higher	Education	for	a	Globalising	World	
There	has	 recently	been	an	explosion	of	education	and	 futures	work	by	governments	and	
international	 organisations,	 including	 the	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	
Development	 (OECD),	 aimed	at	 challenging	 and	 changing	 the	ways	 in	which	 teaching	 and	
learning	 in	higher	education	 is	organised	and	delivered	 (see	OECD,	2000;	Vincent-Lancrin,	
2004).	 Such	 ‘futuring’	 activities	 include	 the	 development	 of	 scenarios	 about	 current	 and	
future	states	of	education,	the	promotion	of	foresight	and	horizon	scanning	activities	aimed	
at	managing	 both	 the	 risks	 that	might	 impede	 the	 realisation	 of	 future	 states	 (Robertson	
and	Muellerleile,	2016)	and	the	risks	of	ignoring	radical	changes	already	taking	place	in	the	
higher	sector	that	could	lead	to	catastrophic	outcomes	(Barber	et	al.,	2014).			
What	these	strategic	interventions	represent	are	explicit	efforts	to	reshape	higher	education	
through	imagining	different	kinds	of	challenges	and	futures	for	its	institutions	and	subjects.	
Such	 efforts	 suggest	 not	 only	 distinct	 (and	 thus	 potentially	 competing)	 imaginaries	 and	
temporalities	at	work,	but	they	 in	turn	demand,	and	produce,	particular	kinds	of	cognitive	
orientations	to	time	–	as	in	time-past,	time-present,	and	time-future.	The	classic	metaphor	
of	the	 Ivory	Tower	to	describe	the	social-world	of	the	university,	with	 its	enclosed	spaces,	
quiet	 libraries	 and	 cloistered	walkways,	 invokes	 the	 idea	of	 time-space	 separate	 from	 the	
boisterous	tempo	of	the	outside	world.	In	this	world,	academics	are	simultaneously	tasked	
with	the	mantle	of	being	guardians	of	accumulated	past	knowledge,	whilst	oriented	to	the	
present	and	 the	 future	by	 the	diligent	 search	 for	 truth.	 In	 this	 socio-temporal	order,	blue	
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skies	 research	 takes	 time,	 experiments	 can	 and	 do	 fail,	 and	 new	 knowledge	 is	 the	 happy	
outcome	of	serendipity.	Uncertainties	about	the	future	are	not	as	much	uncertainties	about	
bad	investments	or	collapsing	share	prices	(though	as	higher	education	becomes	more	and	
more	wired	into	the	global	circuit	of	capital	this	is	an	inevitable	outcome),	but	about	what	
forms	new	knowledge	might	take,	or	even	more	prosaically,	what	my	first-year	class	will	be	
like	this	year!	(Back,	2016)		
Whilst	clearly	a	caricature	of	the	temporal	order	of	higher	education,	and	not	all	academics	
experience	 current	 changes	 as	 all	 bad,	 what	 the	 literature	 on	 time	 in	 the	 academy	 does	
agree	on	is	that	the	pace	of	life	and	control	over	time	in	the	academy	has	changed.	Vostal	
(2015,	2016)	 shows	not	only	 that	 the	 structure	of	academic	 life	and	 its	 temporal	 rhythms	
are	 being	 recalibrated	 but	 that	 these	 shifts	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 relationship	
between	 higher	 education	 and	 global	 capital.	 	 A	 shift	 away	 from	 one	 temporal	 order	 to	
another	takes	ideational,	institutional	and	regulatory	work,	and	the	question	of	how	we	can	
understand	 this	 theoretically	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 social	 and	 political	 nature	 of	 time	 is	 the	
purpose	of	the	following	section.		
	
The	Temporal	Orders	of	Capitalism	and	Its	Orientations		
Any	 argument	 around	 higher	 education,	 the	 future,	 and	 the	 inclusion	 of	 education	more	
directly	 in	 capital	 accumulation,	 suggests	we	need	 to	 look	more	 closely	 at	 capitalism	as	a	
dynamic,	and	at	its	distinct	temporal	order.	Here	the	work	of	Nowotny	(1992,	1994,	2016)	
and	Beckert	(1996,	2014,	2016)	are	particularly	useful	for	my	purposes.	In	her	recent	book	
The	Cunning	of	Uncertainty,	Nowotny	writes:		
The	 arrow	 of	 time	 continues	 to	 advance	 the	 tenuous	 balance	 between	 the	
punctuated,	incomplete	and	biased	knowledge	of	the	past	and	the	uncertainty	of	
what	 the	 future	might	 bring.	 …Ever	 since	 the	modern	 societies	manifested	 an	
unprecedented	 preference	 for	 generating	 novelty,	 the	 future	 became	 an	 open	
horizon	with	 science	 and	 technology	 at	 the	 forefront,	 pushing	 further	 into	 the	
unknown	(2016:	vi).				
Uncertainty	 is	 a	 powerful	 incentive	 in	 striving	 for	 more	 knowledge,	 and	 an	 inherent	
component	of	 research	within	 the	academy	(Nowotny,	2016:	vi-xiii).	And	whilst	capitalism	
itself	 is	 always	 seeking	 to	 manage	 the	 uncertainties	 surrounding	 the	 future,	 it	 is	
paradoxically	 also	 stimulated	 by	 innovation	 and	 feeds	 off	 of	 uncertainty,	 for	 instance	
through	financial	practices,	such	as	hedge	funds,	risk	assessments	and	insurance	policies.			
Jens	 Beckert	 has	 developed	 an	 impressive	 corpus	 of	 work	 on	 the	 temporal	 order	 of	
capitalism	(cf.	Beckert,	1996,	2014,	2016)	that	 is	particularly	useful	 in	that	 in	developing	a	
sociology	of	capitalism,	he	is	particularly	attentive	to	the	temporal	nature	of	social	orders.	
Like	 others,	 Beckert	 (2014:	 2-3)	 argues	 that	 both	 modernity	 and	 capitalism	 embrace	
distinctly	different	temporal	orders	in	contrast	to	pre-modern	and	pre-capitalist	orders.		
Whilst	pre-modern	societies	see	themselves	as	 living	 in	a	fixed,	eternal	present,	by	way	of	
contrast	modern	societies	tend	to	view	the	future	as	open	and	uncertain,	or	as	a	storehouse	
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of	 possibilities.	 Yet	 as	 he	 also	 notes,	much	 of	 the	writing	 on	 temporalities	 and	 temporal	
orientations	 by	 sociologists	 has	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 the	development	 of	modern	 societies	
and	 the	 political,	 rather	 than	 the	 economic.	 In	 speaking	 to	 this	 absence,	 he	 poses	 the	
question:	 “…how	 do	 perceptions	 of	 an	 open	 and	 uncertain	 future	 relate	 to	 the	 capitalist	
economy”?	(Beckert,	2014:	3)			
To	answer	his	question,	Beckert	(2014:	3)	turns	to	the	work	of	the	French	sociologist,	Pierre	
Bourdieu,	and	his	accounts	of	the	Kabyle	people	in	French-controlled	Algeria.	Bourdieu	was	
particularly	 interested	 in	 changes	 in	 temporal	 order	within	 Kabylian	 society	 as	 a	 result	 of	
capitalist	 modernization	 in	 Algeria.	 He	 notes	 how	 the	 social	 and	 temporal	 logics	 of	
traditional	Kabylian	society,	of	solidarity	and	honour,	were	eventually	replaced	by	attitudes	
toward	calculation	and	future	profits.		This	led	to	“…conflicts	in	Kabylian	society	triggered	by	
different	 forms	of	economic	 thinking	and	new	practices	which	were	ultimately	destroying	
the	 traditional	 social	order”	 (op.	 cit:	4).	The	main	point	 to	be	derived	 from	 looking	at	 the	
breakdown	 of	 a	 traditional	 society	 like	 this,	 Beckert	 argues,	 is	 to	 “…highlight	 the	 shift	 in	
temporal	orientation	as	being	at	the	heart	of	capitalism’s	unfolding	dynamic”	(ibid).	Beckert	
explores	how	economic	decision-making	amongst	actors	takes	place	in	capitalist	orders,	and	
particularly	so	under	conditions	of	uncertainty	about	the	future:			
…capitalism	institutionalizes	an	organization	of	economic	activity	in	which	actors	
orient	 themselves	 toward	 an	 open	 and	 unforeseeable	 future.	 Such	 a	 future	
represents	both	unlimited	possibilities	for	actors	as	well	as	a	permanent	threat	
to	 their	 economic	 status.	 At	 the	 macro	 level,	 the	 actions	 induced	 by	 this	
temporal	 order	 produce	 growth	 as	 well	 as	 sporadic	 crises,	 and	 thus	 the	
relentless	dynamics	of	capitalism	(2014:	1).			
In	an	emerging	capitalist	order,	actors	ranging	from	companies	to	entrepreneurs,	investors,	
employees	 and	 consumers	 must	 all	 orient	 their	 activities	 to	 a	 more	 open	 and	 uncertain	
future.		“The	temporary	disposition	of	economic	actors	toward	the	future,	and	the	capability	
to	fill	this	future	with	counterfactual	economic	imaginaries,	is	crucial	to	understanding	both	
how	capitalism	diverges	from	the	economic	orders	that	preceded	it,	and	its	overall	dynamic”	
(Beckert,	2016:	2).	
The	 paradox	 for	 both	modernity	 and	 capitalism	 is	 that,	 ontologically,	 the	 future	 is	 open,	
uncertain,	and	by	definition	cannot	be	known.	How,	then,	do	actors	orient	themselves	and	
make	decisions?		Beckert	(2016)	argues	that	actors	have	perceptions	of	the	social	world,	and	
that	they	develop	expectations	about	the	future	that	 in	turn	 influence	their	decisions.	But	
these	decisions	cannot	be	rational.	Rather	they	are	combinations	of	(i)	what	is	thought	to	be	
currently	 the	 case	 (tomorrow	 will	 be	 like	 today),	 (ii)	 emotions,	 such	 as	 pride	 or	 status	
around	imagined	future	states,	and	(iii)	the	expectations	of	others.		Yet	given	that	the	future	
is	 unknown,	 they	 are	 in	 essence	 ‘fictional	 expectations’.	 They	 are	 ‘fictional’	 in	 that	 they	
provide	 an	 orientation	 in	 decision-making	 “…despite	 the	 incalculability	 of	 the	 outcomes”	
(Beckert,	 2014:	 9).	 They	 are	 ‘expectations’	 in	 that	 they	 are	 social	 and	 not	 individual	
phenomena,	 and	 are	 shaped	 by	 collective	 beliefs	 formed	 from	 communicative	 practices	
ranging	 from	 laypeople	 to	 firms,	politicians,	experts	and	 the	media,	and	are	crucial	 in	 the	
formation	of	imagined	futures.		
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Fictional	expectations	refer	to	the	images	actors	form	as	they	consider	future	states	of	the	
world,	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	 visualise	 causal	 relations,	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	 also	
perceive	 their	 actions	 as	 influencing	 outcomes.	 The	 term	 also	 refers	 to	 the	 symbolic	
qualities	actors	ascribe	to	goods	that	transcend	the	good’s	material	 features.	These	orient	
their	decision-making	despite	the	fact	that	the	future	in	modern	capitalist	societies	cannot	
be	known.		“Actors,	motivated	by	an	imaginary	future	state,	organize	their	activities	based	
on	this	mental	representation	and	the	emotions	associated	with	it”	(Beckert,	2016:	9).	As	a	
result,	 “in	 economic	 practice,	 fictional	 expectations	 take	 a	 narrative	 form,	 and	 become	
articulated	as	stories	that	tell	how	the	future	will	look	and	how	the	economy	will	unfold	into	
the	future	from	the	current	state	of	affairs”	(Beckert,	2016:	10).	These	stories	are	embedded	
in	frames,	which	include	an	ensemble	of	economic	theories,	such	as	development,	risk	and	
calculation,	or	technological	progress,	and	are	mediated	through	the	deployment	of	a	range	
of	 technologies	 and	 instruments,	 such	 as	 maps,	 schedules,	 statistical	 trends,	 impact	
assessments,	risk	analyses,	and	so	on.			
There	 are	 four	 main	 ‘social’	 implications	 of	 Beckert’s	 (2014;	 2016)	 fictional	 expectations	
thesis.	 First,	 fictional	 expectations	 help	 actors	 work	 together	 in	 concert	 in	 the	 face	 of	
uncertainty.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 higher	 education,	 this	 may	 be	 universities	 aligning	 with	
governments	to	ensure	that	institutional	risks	are	minimised,	or	universities	within	a	region	
collaborating	 to	 minimise	 risk.	 Second,	 there	 are	 real-world	 consequences	 in	 that	 these	
expectations	 help	 to	 affect	 the	 future	 (that	 is	 they	 are	 performative),	 but	 they	 are	 also	
broader,	 in	 that	 economic	 theories	 are	 not	 the	 only	 framings	 of	 a	 situation	 with	 the	
potential	 to	 lead	 to	outcomes,	and	 they	do	not	necessarily	 lead	 to	 the	anticipated	 future.	
Third,	the	contingency	of	expectations	is	a	source	of	innovation	in	the	economy,	giving	rise	
to	 new	 ideas	 despite,	 and	 because	 of,	 uncertainty.	 And	 fourth,	 the	 contingency	 of	
expectations	gives	rise	to	a	politics	of	expectations.		
In	 the	 following	 section	 I	 illustrate	 how	 such	 a	 politics	 of	 expectations	 underpins	 the	
discursive,	material	and	institutional	work	involved	in	imagining,	socialising	and	normalising	
trade	 in	 higher	 education	 	whilst	 faced	with	 struggles	 over	 the	meaning	 and	 purposes	 of	
education	 and	 its	 forms	of	 governance.	As	we	will	 see,	 actors’	 different	 expectations	 and	
their	associated	imaginaries	around	education	–	as	variously	a	public	good,	human	right	or	
tradeable	 service	 –	 have	 become	 the	 flashpoints	 around	 which	 political	 struggles	 over	
temporal	 orders	 and	 the	 future	 take	 place.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 efforts	 to	 limit	 the	 spaces	 for	
engagement	 by	 contesting	 actors	 through	 holding	 negotiations	 in	 secret	 and	 locking	 in	
progressive	liberalisation	so	that	the	future	is	protected	from	distributional	struggles.		
	
THE	 CASE:	 	 Recalibrating	 Time-Future	 in	 Education	 Services,	 Global	Markets	 and	 Trade	
Agreements			
Global	education	services	markets,	and	the	inclusion	of	education	in	trade	deals,	are	recent	
developments.	A	key	concern	in	this	paper	is	the	implications	of	this	shift	for	the	temporal	
rhythm	 of	 the	 academy.	 Put	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 question,	 how	 have	 higher	 education	 actors’	
orientations	 toward	 higher	 education	markets,	 services	 economies	 and	 trade	 agreements	
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been	recalibrated	and	realised,	and	what	does	this	mean	for	the	temporal	reorientation	of	
the	university	and	its	actors	in	the	higher	education	sector?				
To	 help	 answer	 this	 question,	 I	 broadly	 focus	 on	 the	 dominant	 countries	 engaged	 in	
advancing	education	trade	agendas	-	Australia,	New	Zealand,	the	UK	and	the	USA	-	who	by	
the	1960s	were	faced	with	major	political-economic	challenges	to	search	for	bases	for	long-
term	capital	accumulation’.	
	I	 draw	on	 selected	policy	 documents,	 statistics	 and	other	 trade	 figures	 (particularly	 from	
Australia),	where	 (mostly	higher)	education	now	 features	as	a	 services	 sector	 to	generate	
GDP	(Robertson	and	Olds,	2018).		As	my	focus	is	on	the	ways	in	which	we	understand	efforts	
to	 shape	 the	 future,	 this	 case	 analysis	 offers	 an	 illustrative/exploratory	 rather	 than	
exhaustive	account	of	the	different	ways	we	can	see	these	processes	at	work.			
	
Imagining	higher	education	as	a	services	sector		
Most	efforts	 to	chart	 the	process	of	 reimagining	public	good	sectors	 like	education	as	key	
services	 sectors	 to	 underpin	 a	 new	 long	 wave	 of	 accumulation,	 point	 to	 the	 influential	
effects	 of	 the	 oil	 shocks	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 the	 economic	 crisis	 that	 followed.	 However,	
Harvey	 (2005)	 shows	 not	 only	 that	 the	 United	 States	 faced	 growing	 competition	 from	
Western	 Europe	 and	 Japan	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1960s,	 but	 also	 that	 newly	 industrialising	
countries	 in	 Asia	 had	 begun	 to	 challenge	 US	 hegemony	 during	 this	 period.	 Bell’s	 (1976)	
pronouncement	that	a	“post-industrial”	society	had	somehow	emerged	organically	out	of	an	
industrial	society	was	symptomatic	of	periods	 like	this;	 that	 is,	of	attempts	to	reimagine	a	
new	 kind	 of	 economy	 and	 society	 from	 a	 collapsing	 social	 order,	 and	 the	 conditions	 that	
might	bring	this	about.		
If	 the	 forecasters	were	 now	 hard	 at	work,	 so	 too	were	 the	 ideologues	 over	 how	 best	 to	
manage	 the	 economy.	What	was	 clear	was	 that	 the	 1970s	 economic	 crisis	 had	 created	 a	
crisis	of	rationality	over	Keynesianism	as	the	post-war	model	of	development.		At	the	same	
time,	 an	 alternative	 narrative	 was	 promoted	 by	 “a	 minority	 of	 ultra-liberal	 economic	
theologians”	 (Hobsbawn,	1994:	409)	committed	 to	a	 free	market	model	as	 the	engine	 for	
economic	 development.	 In	 Beckert’s	 language,	 this	 was	 an	 alternative	 story	 about	 the	
future,	 put	 into	 battle	 with	 an	 existing	 narrative.	 For	 Keynesians,	 high	 wages,	 full	
employment	and	the	welfare	state	were	represented	as	creating	the	consumer	demand	that	
fuelled	 expansion.	 For	 neoliberals,	 their	 story	 was	 that	 the	 future	 wealth	 of	 the	 nation	
depended	on	minimising	the	role	and	cost	of	government,	creating	conditions	whereby	the	
private	sector	would	flourish	and	boost	productivity.			
In	 the	 years	 that	 followed,	 it	 was	 the	 ultra-liberal	 or	 neo-liberal	 neo/liberal	 imaginary	 of	
choice	 and	markets,	 entrepreneurship,	 efficiency	 through	 competition,	 opening	 up	 public	
monopolies	to	private	sector	actors,	and	so	on	which	won	the	day	(Berger	et	al.,	1974).		This	
alternative	vision	of	the	future	set	in	train	a	new	kind	of	logic	in	sectors	like	education;	one	
that	 privileged	 social	 attributes	 such	 as	 individualism,	 competitiveness,	 and	 forms	 of	
calculation	 aimed	 at	 maximising	 returns	 on	 education	 investments	 into	 the	 future.	Most	
importantly,	 this	 neoliberal	 imaginary,	 with	 its	 cultural	 and	 institutional	 frames,	 was	
dependent	upon	and	produced	a	new	cognitive	orientation	to	the	future	(Sennett,	2006).		
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If	 the	 governance	 of	 education	 was	 being	 refashioned	 in	 micro-economic	 policy	 through	
narratives	such	as	human	capital,	consumerism,	and	efficiencies,	so	too	was	education	being	
increasingly	 viewed	 in	 macro-economic	 policy	 as	 central	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 global	
knowledge	and	services-based	economy	(Robertson	et	al.,	2002;	Robertson,	2009).		Indeed,	
by	the	end	of	the	1970s,	trade	in	services	was	becoming	a	major	component	of	international	
trade	 and	 accounted	 for	 an	 increasing	 proportion	 of	 international	 investment.	 However,	
services	 sectors	present	 trading	governments	and	 transnational	 firms	with	huge	problems	
because	of	 remaining	protections	around	public	 services,	or	because	domestic	 regulations	
around	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 inhibit	 the	 entry	 of	 transnational	 actors.	 	Governments,	
allied	 firms	and	competitive	organisations	wanting	to	enter	new	markets	 in	other	parts	of	
the	globe	argued	that	state	monopolies	on	services,	 from	telecommunications	to	banking,	
education	and	health,	should	be	deregulated	and	opened	up	to	competition,	and	to	being	
included	as	a	services	sector,	distinct	from	the	production	of	goods	(Marchak,	1994:	84).		
	
Imagining	 and	materializing	 education	 as	 a	 globally-traded	 services	 sector	 has	 taken,	 and	
continues	 to	 take,	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 political	 work,	 not	 least	 because	 education	
continues	 to	be	 regarded	 in	many	 societies	 as	 a	public	 service.	One	 reason	 for	 the	easier	
alignment	between	the	university	and	global	services	markets	is	that	‘internationalisation’	is	
central	 to	 the	missions	 of	most	 universities.	 Yet,	 here	 internationalisation	 itself	 has	 been	
transformed	 from	 being	 a	 knowledge	 claim	 around	 a	 cosmopolitan	 ideal	 to	 being	
understood	as	an	economic	strategy	(Marginson	and	Considine,	2000).		
	
A	 second	 reason	 for	 the	 easier	 alignment	 is	 that	 from	 the	 early	 1980s	 onwards,	
governments	 in	a	 small	number	of	western	economies	 (especially	Australia,	New	Zealand,	
and	 the	 United	 Kingdom)	 took	 the	 view	 that	 higher	 education	 could	 offer	 them	 a	
comparative	advantage	in	trade	terms,	and	that	they	should	therefore	locate	international	
education	in	their	trade	briefs	and	departments.	Facing	out	to	the	Asian	region	in	particular,	
‘importing’	higher	education	provided	an	 instant	means	for	boosting	 income	as	a	result	of	
being	able	 to	charge	 full-fees.	For	cash-strapped	universities	having	 to	expand	access	 to	a	
larger	number	of	national	students	with	the	same	resources,	international	students	became	
a	 welcome	 source	 of	 revenues.	 The	 result	 was	 a	 spectacular	 increase	 in	 the	 volume	 of	
student	movement	from	the	Asian	region	to	destinations	like	Australia	and	New	Zealand,	in	
turn	transforming	local	infrastructures	and	cultures	(Robertson	and	Kedzierski,	2016).		
	
Trade	 in	 education	 services	 now	 constitutes	 an	 important	 ‘industry’	 in	 countries	 like	
Australia,	New	Zealand,	and	the	United	Kingdom.	Competition	has	led	to	major	innovations	
in	 the	 sector,	 which	 now	 includes	 specialist	 firms	 like	 recruiters,	 the	 growth	 of	 for-profit	
universities	which	 specialize	 in	on-line	 learning	aimed	at	part-time	 learners,	 new	 financial	
products	aimed	at	extending	 student	enrolment,	new	education	divisions	built	 into	global	
firms	 that	 have	 realigned	 their	 investment	 strategies	 in	 line	 with	 projections	 around	
‘emerging	markets’,	and	so	on.		Yet	with	such	a	significant	investment	in,	and	dependence	
upon,	 the	 ‘education	 export	 market’,	 there	 is	 also	 concern	 expressed	 as	 to	 how	 best	 to	
maintain	or	increase	market-share,	and	most	importantly,	how	to	ensure	that	governments	
don’t	return	to	‘national	interest’	agendas	and	limit	international	investment	in	education.				
	
Australia	 is	a	particularly	 interesting	as	a	country	 in	 that	 it	has	gone	furthest	amongst	 the	
top	 services	 exporting	 countries	 in	 reimagining	 and	 strategizing	 the	 materialization	 of	
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education	 as	 an	 education	 services	 sector.	 	 Education	 is	 described	 by	 the	 Australian	
government	not	only	in	trade	terms	as	an	‘export’,	but	is	placed	into	equivalence	with	other	
extractive	 resources	 traded	 on	 the	 global	 market	 –	 gold,	 coal	 and	 iron	 ore,	 as	 Figure	 1	
shows.		
	
<<INSERT	FIGURE	1	ABOUT	HERE>>	
	
Most	 recently,	 Australia	 has	 developed	 what	 it	 calls	 a	 comprehensive	 ‘international	
education’	strategy	that	projects	well	into	the	future	–	2025.		This	projection	this	projection	
is	 justified	by	 the	extrapolation	of	 the	past,	as	Figure	2	 shows;	a	 trend	 in	 the	direction	of	
increasing	growth.		
	
<<INSERT	FIGURE	2	ABOUT	HERE>>	
	
<<INSERT	FIGURE	3	ABOUT	HERE>>	
	
Its	 national	 and	 institutional	 level	 strategies	 are	 also	 shaped	 by	 gathering	 considerable	
amounts	 of	 data	 –	 some	 of	 which	 is	 available	 to	 the	 public,	 and	 other	 that	 is	 more	
granulated,	 and	 sold	 at	 cost	 to	 buyers	 (see	 Figures	 2	 and	 3).	 It	 engages	 in	 considerable	
amounts	 of	 horizon	 scanning,	 and	 produces	 a	 range	 of	 reports	 and	ways	 of	 representing	
developments	 in	 the	sector	and	their	 relation	to	the	 future.	All	provide	a	narrative	 linking	
the	past	and	present	with	an	assumed	future	of	education	as	a	services	sector	and	part	of	
global	trade	flows.		
In	May	2016,	the	Australian	Government	launched	a	National	Strategy	aimed	at	expanding	
the	education	services	sector,	composed	of	“…a	trio	of	key	strategies	for	the	expansion	of	its	
international	 education	 sector:	 a	 national	 strategy	 for	 international	 education,	 a	 market	
development	 roadmap,	 and	 an	 alumni	 engagement	 strategy”	 (Australian	 Government,	
2016,	website)	that	would	make	use	of	innovations	such	as	technology-enabled	learning	via	
online	or	blended	delivery	programmes.	It	is	instructive	to	look	closely	as	to	how	the	future	
is	 imagined	and	strategized	using	 techniques	and	devices	 such	as	 ‘forecasting	 services’	by	
global	accounting	firms,	‘roadmaps’	(with	identified	competitors),	social	groups	like	‘alumni’,	
and	other	kinds	of	networks,	always	in	terms	of	trade	and	investment.		
The	National	 Strategy	 for	 International	 Education	 2025	 itself,	 which	 reflects	 a	
“whole-of-sector”	approach	and	sets	out	a	10-year	plan	 for	 further	developing	
Australia’s	 position	 as	 a	 global	 leader	 in	 education	 and	 training.	 The	 national	
strategy	 is	 based	 around	 three	 pillars:	 “strengthening	 the	 fundamentals”	
(including	 improvements	 to	 student	 services	 and	 quality	 assurance),	 “making	
transformative	 partnerships”	 (which	 focuses	 on	 links	 at	 home	 and	 abroad,	
alumni	networks,	and	visa	policy),	and	“competing	globally.”	
The	 Australian	 International	 Education	 2025	 (AIE2025)	 market	 development	
roadmap,	 is	 the	product	of	both	extensive	 consultations	within	 the	 sector	and	
research	 from	 Deloitte	 Access	 Economics.	 It	 provides	 a	 10-year	 market	
development	 framework	 for	 Australia’s	 education	 exports,	 including	 “game-
changing”	 strategies	 to	 build	 scalable,	 collaborative	 networks	 of	 education	
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providers,	attract	capital	to	fuel	the	sector’s	expansion,	and	target	key	markets	
abroad.	
The	Australia	Global	Alumni	Engagement	Strategy	2016-2020	outlines	a	five-year	
plan	to	strengthen	and	engage	Australia’s	foreign	alumni	with	the	broader	goals	
of	 enhancing	 the	 country’s	 diplomatic	 access	 and	 influence	 and	building	 trade	
and	investment	links.	
“This	signals	the	sector’s	and	the	government’s	commitment	to	work	together	to	
advance	 international	 education	 by	 identifying	 new	 products	 and	 new	
opportunities	 for	 expansion,	 and	 building	 on	 our	 current	 presence	 in	 existing	
markets,”	said	Minister	Colbeck	(Australian	Government,	2016,	website).	
The	temporal	lexicon	around	the	future	is	distinctive	in	this	strategic	policy	document:	a	‘ten	
year	 plan’,	 ‘game	 changing	 strategies’,	 ‘expansion’,	 ‘future	 innovations’,	 and	 so	 on.	 The	
stakes	 are	high	 for	 the	 government	 and	 so	are	 the	potential	 risks	of	 losing	market	 share,	
given	 that	 international	 education	 is	 estimated	 to	 be	 worth	 AUS$19.6	 billion	 (US$14.7	
billion)	a	year	 to	 the	Australian	economy;	 it	 is	 the	nation’s	 third	 largest	export	sector.	 	As	
competition	has	stepped	up,	so	too	have	concerns	over	who	has	what	share	of	the	global	
education	 services	 market,	 and	 how	 that	 might	 play	 out	 in	 the	 future.	 Key	 actors	
(governments,	institutions	and	transnational	firms)	within	economies	that	include	Australia,	
New	 Zealand	 and	 the	 United	 States,	 have	 intensified	 their	 interest	 in	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
domestic	and	 international	 regulatory	systems	of	 the	 inter-state	world	currently,	or	might	
into	 the	 future,	 impede	 the	 project	 of	 creating	 an	 expanding	 global	 trading	 system	 in	
services	–	an	issue	I	now	turn	to.	 	
Globalising	cognitive	frames	and	orientations	–	but	failing	
Transforming	higher	education	from	being	widely	understood	as	a	public	good	into	a	global	
services	 sector	 governed	 through	 global	 trade	 rules	 requires	 complex	 processes	 of	
reframing,	normalising	and	socialising	via	a	range	of	devices,	institutional	arrangements,	and	
new	 social	 relations.	 To	 be	 successful	 across	 global	 space,	 this	 process	 requires	 the	
globalising	and	embedding	of	new	cognitive	frames.			
Challenging	the	cognitive	and	material	barriers	to	global	trade	 in	services	has	been	on	the	
agenda	since	the	early	1980s,	spearheaded	by	service	coalitions	formed	to	lobby	for	change,	
including	 the	 US-based	 Coalition	 of	 Service	 Industries	 (CSI).	 The	 CSI	 used	 its	 lobbying	
capacity	 to	 shape	 negotiations	 taking	 place	 under	 the	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Tariffs	 and	
Trade	(GATT)	during	the	1980s,	to	include	services	and	not	just	goods	in	the	mandate	of	the	
GATT.	Organised	 interests	 in	 the	United	 States	 as	well	 as	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	 the	
United	 Kingdom	 were	 keen	 to	 promote	 a	 new	 post-GATT	 structure,	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organization	(WTO),	with	an	expanded	trade	agenda.		
In	1995	the	WTO	was	launched	to	“…formalize,	deepen	and	widen	an	international	system	
of	trade	regulation.	It	was	also	to	bring	greater	coherence	to	global	policymaking	by	drawing	
together	the	work	of	the	WTO	with	that	of	the	IMF,	the	WB	as	well	as	to	develop	relations	
with	other	bodies”	 (Wilkinson,	2002:	129).	 	 The	WTO	now	presided	over	 the	GATT,	 along	
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with	two	new	areas	of	trade,	the	General	Agreement	on	Trade	in	Service	(GATS),	and	Trade	
Related	Intellectual	Property	Services	(TRIPS).			
	
Members	who	 joined	 the	WTO	opted	 in	under	a	 single	undertaking	 to	a	 series	of	binding	
rules	 and	 a	 built-in	 agenda	 to	 engage	 in	 ongoing	 negotiations	 leading	 to	 progressive	
liberalisation	 into	 the	 future.	 A	 complex	 set	 of	 technologies	 and	 devices	 to	 secure	 this	
cognitive	 orientation	 to	 the	 future	 also	 determined	 the	 work	 of	 the	 actors	 and	 their	
relations	to	each	other,	from	frameworks	of	rules	laying	out	obligations	governing	trade	in	
services,	 to	annexes	on	 specific	 services	 sectors,	 and	 schedules	detailing	 the	 liberalisation	
commitments	 of	 each	WTO	 member.	 An	 exemption	 would	 only	 be	 granted	 under	 GATS	
Article	1.3	(c);	as	“…supplied	neither	on	a	commercial	basis	nor	in	competition	with	one	or	
more	 service	 suppliers”	 if	 the	 service	 could	 show	 that	 it	 existed	 in	 a	 completely	
decommodified	form,	untainted	by	the	market.		
	
The	 GATS	 mechanisms	 are	 worth	 dwelling	 on	 because	 of	 their	 distinctive	 temporal	 and	
cognitive	 orientation	 to	 the	 future.	 The	 first	 is	 progressive	 liberalization.	 This	means	 that	
becoming	a	member	of	the	WTO	(there	are	now	162	countries)	means	that	a	country	must	
commit	to	‘free	trade’	policies	into	the	future.	Second,	negotiations	around	agreed	sectors	
followed	a	‘positive	list’	schedule.	The	member	state	lists	those	service	sectors	and	modes	
that	 it	 is	 prepared	 to	 negotiate	 over	 and	 commit	 whilst	 the	 rest	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	
agreement.	 Switzerland,	 for	 example,	 only	 committed	 its	 private	 universities	 in	 its	 GATS	
agreement.	 Third,	 once	 the	 agreement	 is	 in	 place,	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 investor	 take	
precedence.	 Any	 government	 who	 decides	 to	 limit	 or	 curtail	 investment,	 or	 indeed	 to	
nationalize	a	sector	(perhaps	as	a	result	of	a	shift	 in	political	 ideology),	will	be	asked,	via	a	
dispute	settlement	mechanism,	to	pay	the	 investor	 future	 lost	 income.	 	This	asymmetrical	
relationship	 between	 investors	 in	 education	 services	 and	 the	 needs	 of	 a	 community	
regarding	 education	 is	 an	 example	 of	 what	 Beckert	 (2016)	 refers	 to	 as	 a	 relationship	
between	instruments	and	distributional	struggles.				
	
Despite	efforts	to	 lock	 in	a	particular	cognitive	orientation	to	the	future	that	reflected	the	
interests	of	investors	in	education,	the	GATS	negotiations	proved	to	be	hugely	controversial	
and	 in	 the	 end	 largely	 failed.	 Each	meeting	was	marked	 by	 protests;	 the	 iconic	 Battle	 in	
Seattle	 in	 1999	 was	 hugely	 resonant.	 Between	 meetings,	 campaigners	 organised	 and	
promoted	 education	 as	 a	 human	 right	 and	 not	 a	 commodity.	 To	 do	 so,	 they	 enrolled	 a	
competing	 narrative	 to	 promote	 a	 different	 imaginary	 around	 the	 future.	 Campaigners	
pointed	particularly	 to	 the	 right	 to	education	as	 recognised	 in	 international	 instruments	–	
most	 prominently	 the	 International	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 launched	 in	 1948	 after	
World	War	II,	and	the	Convention	of	the	Human	Rights	of	the	Child	launched	in	1959.		In	a	
specially	 commissioned	 report	 on	GATS,	 the	 Special	 Rapporteur	 for	 Education	 stated	 that	
the	“rapid	development	of	 international	trade	 law	necessitated	a	decisive	reaffirmation	of	
education	as	a	human	right”	(Tomasevski,	2001:	5).	This	led	the	Rapporteur	to	observe		
	
…the	liberalization	of	trade	in	services,	without	adequate	government	regulation	
and	 proper	 assessment	 of	 its	 affects,	 can	 have	 undesirable	 effects.	 Different	
service	 sectors	 require	different	policies	and	 time	 frames	 for	 liberalization	and	
some	areas	are	better	left	under	governmental	authority	(p.	20)…While	the	WTO	
Agreements	 provide	 a	 legal	 framework	 for	 the	 economic	 aspects	 of	 the	
13	
	
liberalisation	 of	 trade,	 they	 focus	 on	 commercial	 objectives.	 The	 norms	 and	
standards	of	human	rights	provide	the	means	of	providing	a	legal	framework	for	
the	 social	 dimensions	 of	 human	 rights…A	 human	 rights	 approach	 to	 trade	
liberalisation	emphasizes	 the	 role	of	 the	State,	not	only	as	negotiator	of	 trade	
rules	 and	 setter	 of	 trade	 policy,	 but	 also	 as	 duty	 bearer	 for	 human	 rights	
(Tomasevski,	2001:	10).			
	
In	her	report,	the	Commissioner	pointed	to	the	different	ways	in	which	GATS,	were	it	to	be	
implemented,	might	exaggerate	 social	 inequalities	 in	education	 if	 the	 state	was	unable	 to	
have	a	degree	of	flexibility	over	the	organisation	of	education.					
	
From	 a	 commercial	 perspective,	 holding	 countries	 to	 their	 commitments	 to	
liberalise	is	important	to	ensure	transparency	and	predictability	in	international	
trade	and	the	payment	of	compensation	is	a	legitimate	commercial	response	to	
the	settlement	of	disputes.	From	a	human	rights	perspective,	however,	the	focus	
is	 less	 on	 predictability	 and	 more	 on	 the	 need	 for	 flexibility	 to	 modify	 or	
withdraw	 commitments	 to	 liberalise	 services	 where	 experience	 demonstrates	
that	 a	 commitment	 constrains	 or	 limits	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 human	 rights.	 The	
need	 for	 flexibility	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 developing	 countries	 given	 that	
they	 are	 in	 a	 dynamic	 process	 of	 building	 infrastructures.	 …Moreover,	 while	
compensation	 to	 affected	 parties	 might	 be	 appropriate	 in	 some	 cases	 upon	
withdrawal	of	commitments,	a	human	rights	approach	would	question	whether	
states	 should	 be	 sanctioned	 for	 taking	 action	 to	 protect	 human	 rights	 (2001:		
28).					
	
These	very	publicly	aired	concerns,	along	with	growing	disquiet	amongst	many	developing	
countries	 as	 to	 what	 free	 trade	 really	 meant	 for	 their	 economic	 development	 more	
generally,	resulted	in	the	WTO	GATS	negotiations	stalling	by	2005.	The	inability	to	convince	
other	 actors	 in	 the	 economy	 to	 share	 in	 similar	 expectations	 about	 education	 as	 an	
investment	 sector	means	 this	 future	 is	not	 likely	 to	be	 realised	 (Beckert,	2016:	275).	As	a	
result,	 the	 strategy	 failed	 to	 also	 shape	 actors’	 cognitive	 orientation	 toward	 education’s	
future	as	a	services	sector	subject	to	WTO	rules.			
 
The	2008	global	financial	crisis	–	a	new	narrative	and	strategy	
Crises	 generate	 new	 semiotic	 and	 material	 opportunities,	 opening	 the	 space	 for	 new	
accounts	 of	what	 is	 to	 be	done	 to	 shape	 and	 secure	 the	 future.	 By	 2011,	 a	 new	wave	of	
mega-trade	in	services	negotiations	had	begun	in	earnest,	stimulated	by	the	global	financial	
crisis	 in	 2008,	 the	 decline	 in	 productivity	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States,	 and	 growing	
unemployment	 (Robertson	 and	 Komljenovic,	 2017).	 Education	 as	 a	 ‘services	 sector’	 was	
again	 on	 these	 agendas,	 though	 those	 contesting	 its	 inclusion	 continued	 to	 point	 to	 its	
public	good	and	not	private	or	trade	status	(Gould,	2014).			
These	negotiations	included	the	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	(TPP)	involving	12	countries	in	the	
Pacific	 Region	 dominated	 by	 the	 United	 States;	 the	 Comprehensive	 Economic	 Trade	
Agreement	 (CETA)	 between	 Canada	 and	 Europe;	 the	 Transatlantic	 Trade	 and	 Investment	
14	
	
Partnership	 (TTIP)	 involving	 Europe	 and	 the	 United	 States;	 and	 the	 Trade	 in	 Services	
Agreement	(TISA)	largely	between	OECD	countries.	However,	this	time	all	negotiations	have	
been	 held	 in	 secret,	 and	 all	 involve	 frameworks	 and	 instruments	 that	 aim	 to	 lock	 in	 the	
interests	of	investors	into	the	future.		
This	more	coercive,	secretive	approach	to	realigning	interests	is	a	fraught	one,	as	the	lack	of	
shared	 expectation	 about	 the	 future	of	 education	 as	 a	 services	 sector	 places	 limits	 on	 its	
potential	to	get	traction	on,	and	control,	the	future.	 	The	formal	withdrawal	of	the	United	
States	 from	 the	 TTP	 (and	 likely	 TTIP)	 following	 the	 election	 of	 Donald	 Trump	 to	 the	 US	
Presidency	 in	 late	2016	 is	a	 case	 in	point.	Trump’s	appeal	 to	US	voters	 	 is	 that	he	argued	
they	did	not	share	in	the	view	that	global	trade	deals	were	good	for	American	workers	and	
their	jobs.		
Nevertheless,	 these	 mega-trade	 deals	 are	 negotiations	 that	 have	 been	 completed	 (with	
CETA,	TPP	awaiting	 final	approval	by	 the	various	members)	or	are	continuing	 (TISA,	TTIP).	
This	raises	the	question	as	to	how	the	future	for	education	is	 imagined,	and	what	kinds	of	
discourses,	devices,	 institutional	arrangements	and	social	norms	are	being	deployed	to	do	
the	 work	 of	 creating	 shared	 expectations	 about	 that	 future	 and	 the	 temporal	 order	 of	
capitalism.				
One	such	device	is	the	‘Impact	Assessment’	used	to	convince	sceptics	and	enrol	promoters,	
and	 thus	 align	 expectations,	 as	 to	 the	 longer-term	 outcomes	 of	 these	 deals.	 The	 Impact	
Assessment	for	TTIP	was	conducted	by	the	Centre	for	European	Policy	Studies	(CEPS),	a	pro-
business	think-tank	located	in	Brussels	(see	Pelkmans	et	al.,	2014).	This	Impact	Assessment	
was	used	by	the	European	Commission	to	project	the	annual	gains	to	be	had	from	the	TTIP	
of	€119b	for	the	EU	and	€95b	for	the	USA,	suggesting	that	European	countries	would	be	the	
main	beneficiaries.		
This	particular	approach	to	Impact	Assessments	makes	specific	assumptions	about	capitalist	
markets	and	futures.	De	Ville	and	Siles-Brȕgge	(2015)	show	that	the	TTIP	Impact	Assessment	
depends	 on	 Computational	 General	 Equilibrium	 Modelling	 (CGEM).	 CGEM	 embraces	
neoclassical	 economic	 assumptions:	 there	 is	 no	 excess	 demand,	 all	 markets	 clear	 under	
conditions	of	perfect	competition,	and	we	can	model	market	processes	through	numerical	
data	and	results.	Yet	De	Ville	and	Siles-Brȕgge	(2015)	argue	CGE	models	have	been	subject	
to	critique,	even	within	economics,	 in	 that	 there	are	 information	asymmetries,	 individuals	
are	 often	 driven	 by	more	 complex	 sets	 of	 values,	 and	 labour	 and	 product	markets	 rarely	
clear	at	 the	 same	 time.	The	CGEM	 is	used	 to	model	 three	kinds	of	policy	options;	 from	a	
baseline	 option	 to	 a	 comprehensive	 and	 ambitious	 one,	 of	 removing	 all	 duties,	 reducing	
tariff	 and	 non-tariff	 barriers	 (NTBs)	 on	 goods	 and	 services,	 and	 on	 government	
procurement.	 For	 the	 base-line	 option,	 the	 gains	 are	 negligible.	 The	 gains	 on	 the	 more	
comprehensive	scenario,	 the	one	used	by	the	Commission	to	make	the	economic	case	for	
TTIP,	 are	 presented	 as	 more	 substantial.	 And	 it	 is	 this	 latter	 future	 that	 is	 used	 by	 the	
Commission	in	its	public	defence	of	TTIP.		
De	Ville	and	Siles-Brȕgge	(2015)	argue	that	this	kind	of	Impact	Assessment	acts	like	a	black	
box;	it	not	only	skews	the	terms	of	the	economic	and	political	debate	in	directions	that	suit	
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the	Commission’s	agenda,	but	also	has	a	particular	narrative	that	it	offers	of	the	future.		This	
future	does	not	 include	the	costs	 that	 result	 from	macro-economic	adjustments	–	such	as	
alignment	to	new	standards,	the	displacement	and	retraining	of	workers,	potential	welfare	
losses	 in	 the	 society,	or	 the	 threat	 to	public	policy	 goals	 (De	Ville	 and	Siles-Brȕgge,	2015:	
669).	 In	 contesting	 this	 Impact	 Assessment	 narrative,	 De	 Ville	 and	 Siles-Brȕgge	 (2015)	
present	the	case	of	the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement,	which	also	used	the	CGEM.	
They	compare	the	ex-post	evidence	with	the	ex-ante	claims	which	show	that	both	Mexico	
and	Canada	fared	significantly	worse	than	predicted	in	terms	of	economic	gains	(especially	
around	costs	over	 labour	displacements).	 In	 relation	 to	TTIP,	 they	argue	a	combination	of	
the	 assumptions	 built	 into	 the	 CGEM,	 the	 regulatory	 mechanism	 to	 be	 used,	 and	 the	
capacity	to	 liberalise	across	the	board,	exaggerate	the	potential	economic	benefits	of	TTIP	
whilst	 under-playing	 other	 likely	 outcomes	 –	 such	 as	 a	 race-to-the-bottom	 in	 social,	
educational	and	environmental	standards.			
A	second	temporal	device	in	these	trade	deals	is	‘the	ratchet	effect’.		Any	new	activity	in	the	
sector	into	the	future	will	be	subject	to	the	principles	of	the	market	and	the	interests	of	the	
investors,	as	enshrined	in	the	trade	agreement.	The	ratchet	process	aims	to	draw	more	and	
more	of	the	society	into	functioning	like	a	capitalist	market.		Linked	to	this	is	a	third	device	
that	now	works	the	opposite	way	to	the	GATS;	it	deploys	a	negative	and	not	a	positive	list.	A	
negative	list	means	identifying	all	those	activities	that	are	to	be	excluded	so	that	what	is	not	
on	 the	 list	 is	 included.	 The	 expectation	 is	 that	 the	 negotiators	 have	 a	 god-optic	 on	 the	
present	and	the	future;	as	an	all	seeing	and	knowing	eye	that	can	see	sufficiently	to	know	
what	 to	 anticipate.	 Through	 these	 two	 devices,	 we	 see	 education	 traders	 and	 investors	
colonising	the	future	of	higher	education,	sanctioned	the	governments’	negotiators,	so	that	
the	future	is	not	locked	in	as	a	resource	for	global	capitalism.			
	
Concluding	Thoughts:	Higher	Education	and	Temporal	Order	of	Capitalism	
I	began	this	paper	by	arguing	that	higher	education,	as	a	knowledge-producing	sector,	has	
its	 own	 temporal	 rhythms	 and	 ordering	 processes.	 One	 temporal	modality	 is	 toward	 the	
past,	as	accumulated	knowledges	become	resources	for	the	present,	and	as	academics	carry	
out	 their	 work	 as	 curators	 and	 custodians.	 A	 second	 temporal	 modality	 is	 toward	 the	
present	via	 the	unfolding	of	a	day,	 term	and	year,	 and	 the	patterns	of	 teaching,	 learning,	
marking,	 researching,	 administering,	 that	 punctuate,	 thus	 creating	 the	 rhythm	 of	 an	
academic	 year	 in	 particular	 way.	 A	 third	 modality	 is	 the	 future	 –	 one	 marked	 by	 the	
uncertainty	 of	 the	 research	 process,	 the	 serendipity	 of	 the	 unexpected,	 and	 the	 happy	
coincidences	that	turn	into	something	–	perhaps	a	Nobel	Award.			
There	 is	 little	doubt	the	academy	is	being	challenged	not	only	to	be	efficient	 in	our	use	of	
time	 and	 more	 certain	 in	 what	 we	 do.	 These	 developments	 are	 about	 controlling	 the	
present	and	the	future.	Yet	to	a	large	extent,	they	are	also	the	outcomes	of	the	leakage	of	
the	dynamics	of	capitalism	into	the	academy,	as	higher	education	is	increasingly	drawn	into	
becoming	a	value-producing	sector	in	its	own	right.	
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Yet	 it	 is	 through	 looking	more	 closely	 at	 the	ways	 in	which	 higher	 education	 futures	 are	
regarded	 as	 resources	 to	 be	 reimagined,	 colonised	 and	 exploited	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
investor	 certainty,	 that	 we	 see	 the	 full	 import	 of	 a	 different	 temporal	 imagination	 and	
rhythm	on	the	sector.		These	trade	agreements	aim	to	not	only	transform	the	future	into	an	
extended	 present	 (Nowotny,	 1994),	 but	 the	 extended	 present	 contains	 the	 progressive	
cognitive	reorientation	of	actors	to	a	future	shaped	by	capitalist	dynamics	(Beckert,	2016).			
This	 case	 helps	 to	 generate	 new	 insights	 around	 time	 future	 in	 a	 substantive	 sense,	 and	
might	become	the	basis	 for	 further	 theoretical	work	of	 the	kind	that	Nowotny	and	others	
have	called	for.			
And	if	time	is	political	and	higher	education	is	also	in	a	normative	sense	one	of	the	spaces	
that	we	might	use	to	think	critically	about	the	future,	then	our	social	theories	can	be	put	to	
work	to	change	the	current	state	of	affairs.	In	this	regard,	I	have	shown	that	ongoing	efforts	
to	commodify	higher	education,	on	the	one	hand,	and	to	colonise	higher	education	futures	
exclusively	 to	 serve	 the	 interests	 of	 economic	 investors,	 on	 the	 other,	 continue	 to	 be	
contested.	 Destabilising	 these	 possible	 futures	 are	 the	 huge	 contradictions	 that	 now	
emerge,	 particularly	 for	 higher	 education	 institutions,	 and	 the	 risks	 to	 knowledge	
production	more	generally	as	higher	education	gets	more	tightly	wound	into	the	circuit	of	
capital,	its	temporalities,	the	dynamics	of	capitalism,	and	tendencies	toward	crisis.		
However,	this	new	temporal	order	is	yet	to	become	common	sense,	and	the	existing	order	is	
yet	 to	 die.	 	 Competing	 narratives	 about	 the	 future	 of	 higher	 education	 and	 higher	
education’s	futuring	thus	open	the	space	for	recognising	the	importance	of	contesting	these	
narratives	and	the	devices	and	other	mechanisms	aimed	at	socialising	and	normalising	one	
narrative	over	another.		And	if	the	future	is	a	resource	to	be	claimed,	then	maybe	we	might	
also	 begin	 the	 process	 of	 imagining	 a	 future	 to	 be	 realised	 through	 an	 alignment	 of	
expectations	 that	 places	 knowledge,	 openness,	 sharing	 and	 community	 as	 an	 alternative	
cognitive	orientation	toward	the	future.				
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Insert	FIGURES	
	
	
Figure	1:	Education	represented	as	equivalent	to	extractive	industries	that	are	traded.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	2:		Assumptions	of	the	future	through	representing	the	past.	
	
20	
	
	
Figure	3:	The	circumstances	and	decisions	of	education	consumers	
	
	
